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Rabbinic analysis of problematic speech is an intriguing subject, given the importance
of speech as a poetic device and literary motif in the biblical tradition, the legal force of
verbal utterances in rabbinic jurisprudence, and the prestige of learned oral discourse
as a social practice in rabbinic culture.1 Rabbinic tradition meticulously parses divine
and human speech, and the destructive potential of the latter is amply treated.2 Unfor-
tunately, m. B. Metzi’a 4:10, the locus classicus for the mishnaic prohibition of hônāyâ
wide7 bārîm (“verbal wronging”), does not provide a definition of the offence.3 Instead,
the mishnah offers three varied examples of verbal wronging, followed by a biblical
quotation which is not used in all the parallels and whose exegetical and rhetorical
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1 I wish to offer my profound thanks to a learned, anonymous reader for Florilegium, whose comments
and queries pressed me to sharpen my argument. I also thank my students and colleagues at the Univer-
sity of British Columbia, the Diamond Chair in Jewish Law and Ethics at UBC, my incommensurably
patient and perceptive partner, Frederick Fajardo, and, of course, Sheila Delany. Non-specialists unfamil-
iar with the abbreviation conventions for references to rabbinic literature, basic chronology of rabbinic
collections, or terminology are encouraged to consult the brief Appendix at the end of this article.
2 A typical example is m. ‘Arak. 3:5: “Thus the one who speaks (slander) with his mouth is more
[heavily fined] than the one who commits a (nonverbal) act.” The gemara to the present mishnah
(b. B. Metzi’a 58b) cites a baraita (a tannaitic teaching not included in the Mishnah) likening pub-
lic humiliation to manslaughter.
3 The form used in the most important manuscript of the Mishnah (MS Kaufmann A 50) is usually
hônāyâ (from ynh / hônâ). The form used in the editio princeps of the Mishnah (Naples, 1492) is ’ônā’â.
See Lapin, Early Rabbinic Civil Law, 266.
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functions are not self-evident. Hônāyâ is a verbal noun with a broad semantic range
including deceit, overreaching, overcharging, underpaying, oppression, and painful
insult.4
m. B. Metzi’a 4:10
Just as there is commercial hônāyâ,
so too there is verbal hônāyâ.
One should not say to [a vendor; lit., “to him”], “How much is this object?” if
one had no intention of purchasing.
If someone were a penitent, one should not say to him, “Remember your for-
mer deeds.”
If someone were a child of proselytes, one should not say to him, “Remember 
the deeds of your ancestors [lit., “fathers”].”
As it is said, “You shall not wrong a stranger or oppress him.”
(Exod. 22:20, which continues,“for you were strangers in the land of Egypt.”)5
I contend that “verbal wronging” in m. B. Metzi’a 4:10 is deliberately deceptive,
harmful speech in commercial and non-commercial contexts. Malicious intent cannot
be proved in cases of hônāyâ wide7 bārîm; it is a crime of conscience that only God can
identify definitively and punish. The mishnah’s selection and sequence of examples may
have been modelled on a similar sequence in Lev. 19:11-18, while the biblical quota-
tion (Exod. 22:20) seems to have several purposes — exegetical, rhetorical, and edito-
rial-anthological — as explained below.
The analysis that follows is offered neither as an assertion of the authorial intent nor
with a claim to being the only legitimate reading of this mishnaic pericope. It is, rather,
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4 In his perceptive analysis of (predominantly) commercial fraud, Lapin notes that “oppression” is the
root meaning of hônāyâ; given its broad range, he leaves the term untranslated. Lapin, Early Rabbinic
Civil Law, 266. While cognizant of the complexity of the issue, I employ a few different translations faith-
ful to the semantic range.
5 m. B. Metzi’a 4:10. All rabbinic text translations are my own unless otherwise indicated, and biblical
references are according to the Masoretic Tradition of the Hebrew Bible and the JPS Tanakh transla-
tion; Orlinsky et al., eds. & trans., Tanakh: A New Translation. Mishnah citations follow standard
printed editions of tractate B. Metzi’a in the Order on Damages. Since determining the intended (but
elusive) boundaries of a scriptural quotation is crucial, I reproduce the quoted biblical text and (in
parentheses) the remainder of the verse. On quotation boundaries, see Samely, Rabbinic Interpreta-
tion, 10 and 31-58.
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a reading of what I take to be some of its discursive operations, in the context of closely
parallel and related rabbinic and non-rabbinic material and other data. It represents an
effort to elucidate some important aspects of this mishnah, based on a reconstruction
of relevant components of the body of rabbinic discourse about verbal wronging that
lies behind the surviving texts.6 Given the interpretative complications posed by the use
of identical and similar tannaitic material in different rabbinic genres, anthologies, cul-
tural locations, and periods, it is hardly surprising that texts such as this mishnaic peri-
cope lend themselves to different interpretations. The notion of “verbal wronging”
appears to have been applied at the tannaitic and amoraic literary strata to commercial
and non-commercial contexts, with damage understood in economic and other (social
and personal) terms. Given the intertwining of social and economic status and damage,
this overlap is not surprising. The embedding of this teaching in the fourth chapter of
m. B. Metzi’a, and possibly also the gemara in the Yerushalmi, points toward an empha-
sis on the economic setting in the earlier Palestinian collections. Related material in the
halakhic midrashim and in the Tosefta entail a broader set of concerns. The embedding
of the mishnah in the sugya within the Bavli continues to develop this emphasis on
broader social and personal damage.
A Familiar, but Perplexing Mishnaic Pericope
Comparing this text to closely parallel and related versions within other rabbinic antholo-
gies reveals some different examples of “verbal wronging,” different sequences, and dif-
ferent biblical prooftexts. The mishnah concludes with a biblical prooftext, Exod. 22:20,
that is not found in some of the parallel versions, which instead emphasize Lev. 25:14
and 25:17.7 The transgression itself is not explicitly defined in these versions, either.
The immediate context — especially the rest of chapter four of m. B. Metzi’a — pertains
to commercial fraud, which may involve verbal misrepresentation,8 but the mish-
nah’s second and third examples do not explicitly refer to a commercial setting, and
thus “verbal wronging” must be something other than verbally enacted commercial
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6 Milikowsky’s lucid theoretical articulation of the distinctions between a “text,” a “document,” and the
“work” behind these productions is crucial for my approach to rabbinic literature in general; Milikowsky,
Reflections.
7 The Exodus verse is found in the following parallels: Mek de-R. Ishmael, ch. 18, Midr tannaim lede-
varim 23:17, and Eliyyahu r., p. 106. It is not used in the parallels in Sifra behar 3 or 4, in Sifre devarim
281, or in the gemara of b. B. Metzi’a 58b or y. B. Metzi’a 4:7, 9d. It does appear at b. B. Metzi’a 59b.
8 M. B. Metzi’a 4:2 explicitly refers to keeping one’s word.
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fraud.9 While all three examples might occur in a commercial setting, only the first of
the three examples clearly fits such a context; the social setting of the other two ex-
amples is unclear. Although the potential harm resulting from each of the three instances
of verbal wronging seems self-evident, this harm increases incrementally from the first
to the third illustration, as does the probative difficulty. Thus, the sequence within the
mishnah seems quite deliberate, even if its placement within chapter four appears some-
what disjunctive.
Seeming digressions prompted by associative linkages among topics are a common
anthological feature of rabbinic literature. Although a textual parallel may clarify the
seeming disjunction, one should not assume that the internal logic or the anthological
context of a rabbinic teaching found in one collection is identical to the internal logic
or the anthological context of other versions in other anthologies. For these and other
reasons, Jacob Neusner’s documentary method is both fundamentally necessary and
insufficient.10 Although a synchronic comparison of these versions is methodologically
problematic, an emerging hypothesis that the Tosefta or the Sifra may provide evidence
of pre-mishnaic versions of tannaitic teachings supports the methodological step of
consulting the toseftan and Sifra versions, as well as Bavli baraitas, for the purpose of elu-
cidating the mishnah’s meaning.11 Nevertheless, subsequent revisions of earlier traditions,
including harmonizations and errors as well as longstanding variations in largely oral
transmission of tannaitic teachings, frustrate the identification of “original” versions;
indeed, the search for an original version may be fruitless.12 Consequently, I focus on the
composite unit of the mishnah now in hand, while remaining attentive to its analogues.
As Howard Apothaker observes in a discussion of the Sifra parallel to this mishnah,
Neusner long ago brought to our attention the apparently disjointed flow of this partic-
ular section of the Mishnah.13 Neusner’s observations that the second and third ex-
amples “are cases not of fraud but of mere churlishness” and that only the first example
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9 It is also worth noting that m. B. Metzi’a 4:10 is the only mishnah in chapter four which has an explicit
biblical prooftext.
10 Neusner usefully argues that the editorial strategies of each rabbinic collection should be factored into
analyses of particular traditions appearing in multiple anthologies. For an early formulation of Neusner’s
documentary approach, see The Documentary Foundation, ix-xv. For a more nuanced formulation, see
his “Defining Rabbinic Literature,” 131-46.
11 See Hauptman, Rereading the Mishnah; cf. Elman, Authority and Tradition. For the Sifra, see R. Reich-
man, Mishnah und Sifra; Hezser, “Classical Rabbinic Literature,” 132.
12 See Jaffee, ‘Torah in the Mouth,’ 124; and Alexander, Transmitting Mishnah, 6-7. For an important,
nuanced approach to textual criticism in the field of rabbinic literature, see Milikowsky, “Reflections.”
13 Neusner, A History of the Mishnaic Law of Damages, 2:53; Apothaker, Sifra, Dibbura deSinai, 383.
11fl_23.1_daum.qxd  2008/11/19  16:02 PM  Page 176
“is directly relevant” (to the subject of fraud) highlight the difficulty of explaining the
logical connection among the three examples.14 It is this difficulty that prompts the
present discussion.
Explaining this mishnah (m. B. Metzi’a 4:10) is important for another reason. This
particular mishnah came to serve as the redactional foundation for the widely treated
sugya containing the Bavli’s version of the famous “Oven of Akhnai” narrative, a foun-
dational tale narrating, inter alia, the banning of r. Eliezer b. Hyrcanos in the course of
a legal dispute.15 In that fantastical tale r. Eliezer’s hurt feelings — in spite of r. Aqiva’s
considerable efforts to spare them when delivering the news of the banning — erupt
destructively, resulting in the supernatural destruction of crops and, ultimately, in the
death of his brother-in-law, Rabban Gamaliel.16 Jeffrey Rubenstein claims that verbal
wronging is the “explicit interpretive key” to the Oven of Akhnai narrative in that the
mishnah “articulates the prohibition [against verbal wronging] and provides several
examples.”17 In two very astute treatments of the talmudic sugya, he discusses verbal
wronging at some length, without analysing the mishnah’s structure or its examples
with the same scrupulous attention to detail that he brings to other moments in the
sugya.18 The learned and penetrating analysis of the Oven of Akhnai narrative in Devora
Steinmetz’s recent discussion of the phenomenology of the “inter-agadic” networks in
the Bavli does not treat extensively the nature of the sugya’s mishnaic incipit regarding
verbal wronging.19
Various scholars have advanced our understanding of this mishnah, but important
differences on key issues remain. Although Rubenstein reads m. B. Metzi’a 4:10 as a
“Verbal Wronging”: An Analysis of Speech Banned in m. Bava Metzi’a 4:10 177
14 Neusner, A History of the Mishnaic Law of Damages, 2:62.
15 In contrast, the Yerushalmi’s elliptical version of the Akhnai narrative is found in a very different redac-
tional context: a sugya in y. Mo’ed Qatan 3:1, 81c-d treating aspects of banning, among other topics.
The mishnah there (m. Mo’ed Qatan 3:1) includes those released from bans among those who may cut
their hair during the intermediate days of a festival. The complexity of the Oven of Akhnai narrative
has spawned a vast body of scholarship. The story depicts a legal dispute in which the sage Eliezer is
outvoted in a decision concerning the purification of an oven. His supernatural feats (suggesting divine
support) fail to sway his colleagues, and when he still refuses to yield, he is banned and a series of
calamities ensues.
16 Rabban Gamaliel II is the leader under whose authority Eliezer is banned; r. Eliezer is married to
Gamaliel’s sister.
17 Rubenstein, The Culture of the Babylonian Talmud, 71; Rubenstein, Talmudic Stories, 34-63. Cf. Stein-
metz, “Agada Unbound.”
18 Of course, the Akhnai narrative, rather than the mishnah, is his principal focus in both contexts. Cf.
Rubenstein, Talmudic Stories, 35-36, and Rubenstein, The Culture of the Babylonian Talmud, 71-73.
19 This is understandable, as Steinmetz’s focus in “Agada Unbound” is on other issues.
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statement about verbal wronging, he does not restrict the second and third examples to
a commercial setting.20 In contrast, whereas the mishnah explicitly moves from the sub-
ject of commercial to verbal fraud, Borowitz and Schwartz’s otherwise sensitive discus-
sion of ’ônā’at de7 bārîm defines “fraudulent representation” as “deceit in the market-
place,” and they provide examples only of commercial fraud.21 While the mishnah’s
redactional context appears to frame verbal hônāyâ in a commercial setting, the tannaitic
and amoraic sources point to a broader notion of a particularly problematic type of
misleading speech in various social contexts.22 Citing the third example in this mishnah
as a prohibition warning “the native Jew against harming or shaming the proselyte in
any way” (even though the third example actually refers to a descendant of proselytes,
rather than to a proselyte), Bernard Bamberger adds that this has “legal import” but “is
not susceptible of legal control,” thus pointing in the direction of crimes of conscience.23
Howard Apothaker describes the mishnah’s examples of verbal wronging as “matters
of conscience” punishable only by God; nevertheless, his otherwise very perceptive dis-
cussion does not explain the mishnah’s choice of examples or its sequence.24
The Sifra on Leviticus in four locations25 as well as two talmudic sugyot (includ-
ing the one containing this mishna),26 the toseftan parallel,27 and possibly the Yerushalmi
(y. B. Metzi’a 4:7, 9d) all support the interpretation of verbal wronging as a crime of
conscience. Rashi’s comments on b. B. Metzi’a 58b and on b. Qidd. 32b point in the same
direction.28 As I explain below, the tannaitic traditions suggest that verbal wronging must
be malicious; therefore, if verbal wronging is the explicit interpretive key to the aggadah,
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20 Rubenstein, The Culture of the Babylonian Talmud, 71 and 182 n. 11.Neusner’s approach here is simi-
lar; Neusner, A History of the Mishnaic Law of Damages – Part Two: Baba Mesia, 2:62.
21 Of course, their ambitious volume necessarily reduces to a particular category moral concepts appli-
cable also to other categories. My quibble here is that the moral complexity of this particular concept
requires further elucidation. Borowitz and Schwartz, The Jewish Moral Virtues, 33.
22 The gemara in the Yerushalmi (y. B. Metzi’a 4:7, 9d) does not directly address this part of the mishnah;
rather, it treats deceptive and potentially misleading non-verbal commercial practices.
23 Bamberger, Proselytism in the Talmudic Period, 158.
24 However, Apothaker’s principal focus is the parallel in Sifra rather than the mishnaic version. Apothaker,
Sifra, Dibbura deSinai, 100 and 384. My analysis has benefited considerably from Apothaker’s insight-
ful discussion.
25 Sifra Dibbura deSinai BeHar 3:4 and 6:6; and Qedoshim 2:2 and 3:7.
26 b. B. Metzi’a 58b and b. Qidd. 32b: s.v. dābār hammāsûr lallêb.
27 b. B. Metzi’a 3:25.
28 s.v. dābār hammāsûr lallêb.
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the Akhnai narrative may thematize the problems of unintentional verbal wronging
and of intentional but unprovable verbal wronging (in the technical sense of the mish-
nah). Perhaps the embedding of the mishnah in this particular sugya has obscured its
earlier, tannaitic point.
From Commercial Fraud to General Verbal Wronging
This mishnah is a deceptively simple literary and pedagogical composition, in which
each of three illustrative cases increasingly complicates a seemingly straightforward
topic. It contains bipartite and tripartite structures facilitating oral transmission. Both
the introductory formulation and the closing scriptural prooftext are explicitly bipar-
tite; hence these elements book-end a tripartite section. Somewhat unusually for the
Mishnah (albeit certainly not exceptionally), it concludes by citing a scriptural proof-
text, the use of which I analyse below. As is usually the case in the Mishnah, its formu-
lations are unattributed.29
The pericope at m. B. Metzi’a 4:10 connects analogically the nature and prohi-
bition of fraud in commercial transactions, which is the subject of the preceding
(and subsequent) mishnaic units, to harmful speech per se. A broader application of
wrongful speech to non-commercial social interactions is more developed in the
related versions, particularly in the Tosefta, Sifra, and Bavli, which include offen-
sively discouraging would-be proselytes and offering hurtful words of consolation to
mourners.
The mishnah begins with a standard linguistic comparative formula to link the sub-
jects of commercial and verbal wronging or fraud — “just as . . . so too” ke7 šēm še [. . .]
kāk. This formula provides a topical and logical transition to verbal wronging.30 The
primary position of the first example may be due in part to the fact that it overlaps the
domains of, and provides a smooth transition between, commercial fraud and the par-
ticularly thorny transgression of verbal hônāyâ. The three examples of verbal wronging
entail a semantic shift in the usage of the term hônāyâ from (commercial) fraud per se
to verbal harm, deception, or offence which is impossible to verify.
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29 On closely parallel versions of this tannaitic teaching attributed to r. Judah (probably the fourth gen-
eration tanna Judah b. Ilai) or, in a different topical context in b. Pes 112b, to r. Ishmael b. r. Jose (the
fifth generation tanna close to the house of r. Judah I), see below.
30 The tosefta not only compares these two kinds of fraud, but asserts (without attribution) that verbal
fraud is worse. It bases this assessment on Lev. 25:17, on which see below. The related baraita in the Bavli
(b. B. Metzi’a 58b) attributes this comparative assessment to r. Yohanan in r. Simeon b. Yohai’s name.
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The First Example: Verbal Wronging in the Marketplace
In the modern Mediterranean context, a negotiation, once initiated, is customarily
concluded through compromise by both parties. Biblical narratives about negotiated
transactions depict a similar practice: after some negotiation, a sale is transacted.31 An
aborted transaction in a small-scale, subsistence market, in which similar items were
being offered for sale in the vicinity with comparably low profit margins, might dam-
age a would-be seller. A price enquiry by a purchaser who failed to make a purchase
would raise questions in the minds of nearby witnesses about the value of the goods, the
integrity of the seller, the fairness of the price, the seller’s willingness to compromise (in
a more loosely regulated market), and so on. Thus, the insincere query about the price
of an item — a case of verbal hônāyâ — might very well suggest to onlookers that the
merchant was culpable in a matter of commercial fraud. The seriousness of the matter
is made clear by the legal discussion of cancelled sales in chapter four of the mishnaic
tractate B. Metzi’a.32
Moreover, the seller, whose time and attention were occupied by the insincere pur-
chaser, might in the meantime have lost the opportunity to conclude profitable sales to
genuinely interested buyers in a crowded market. Ze’ev Safrai suggests that in Roman
Palestine, market rates were relatively well established, and that since a deviation of
more than one-sixth is one measure of pricing fraud, the laws of commercial fraud are
based on an assumption of fairly stable prices. Safrai counsels caution regarding reliance
on prices reported in talmudic literature, but also contends that prices were probably
“rigid” except during periods reflecting seasonal variations, special circumstances like
fairs, and periods of anarchy, such as those in the third century.33 Daniel Sperber’s analy-
sis of prices in Roman Palestine suggests that prices were relatively stable in the first two
centuries.34
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31 See Gen. 23.
32 In the city of Lydda, r. Tarfon had proposed raising the fraud deviation to one-third of the going
rate but extending to a full day the period within which a dissatisfied buyer could return an item
(allowing time to show the item to another merchant or a relative). The deviation rate change
favoured sellers, and the time extension favoured buyers; the Mishnah rejected both variations (m.
B. Metzi’a 4:3).
33 See m. B. Metzi’a 4.3. Safrai, The Economy of Roman Palestine, esp. 433-34. Cf. Rosenfeld and Menirav,
“Methods of Pricing and Price Regulation,” and Rosenfeld and Menirav, “Fraud.”
34 The Mishnah’s publication may have preceded the inflationary fluidity of the third century. Diocletian’s cur-
rency and price reforms are dated to 295-301. Even in the first two centuries, local prices varied significantly:
Egyptian wheat cost only half as much as Palestinian wheat, and even assuming a 10% transportation
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If prices did fluctuate significantly, a deflationary catalyst at one stall might desta-
bilize prices and social relations elsewhere in the market. It might cause damage to a mar-
ginally profitable merchant, who may have needlessly lowered his prices in reaction to
a seemingly dissatisfied buyer. The impact on other merchants would conceivably be dam-
aging as well. If a seller were an employee rather than the owner of the stall, the employer
would be likely to assume that a sincere buyer was treated rudely or inequitably by an
unsuccessful salesperson. In addition, a vendor might suspect bad faith on the part of
the potential purchaser. If the vendor were an itinerant or a sojourner (gēr) in a mar-
ket, misunderstandings or disputes could easily ensue. The fraudulent price query
might be associated with professional resellers, an especially despised presence in a
market.35
Thus, this first case is one in which commercial and social damage — which is vir-
tually impossible to prove or calculate — might easily be caused by insincere albeit not
transparently malicious speech. Crucially, the fraudulent intent of such speech is vir-
tually impossible to ascertain (as is the damage which may be caused by it), since even
sincere would-be buyers do not always close a sale. The importance of intention may
explain the Bavli’s version of the baraita, in which r. Judah condemns asking about a price
when one has no money.36 The disambiguating variation — “when one has no money” —
clarifies that a deceitful price query occurs when the question cannot possibly lead to
a purchase no matter what the response. Another disambiguating variation is found in
the Sifra, Tosefta, and Bavli versions: the deceptive questioner not only asks the price,
but also eyes the article. Such an elaborate, even studied performance of deception
would raise expectations even higher than an insincere query alone.
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cost, the price variations were significant; Sperber, Roman Palestine, 127. Rosenfeld and Menirav note
that price competition would have protected buyers’ interests more efficiently in larger, urban markets,
such as Sepphoris, Tiberias, or Caesarea, than in smaller settlements, where “the fraud laws were
extremely important”; Rosenfeld and Menirav, “Fraud,” 621-22.
35 Lapin notes Cicero’s characterization of the professional reseller as dirty or dishonourable (sordidus);
for Cicero, resellers “would not be successful unless they were to lie very much.” Cicero, De Officiis,
1:150-51. Lapin, Early Rabbinic Civil Law, 142.
36 See b. B. Metzi’a 58b; cf. b. Pesah.112b. The example of the fraudulent price query is also attributed to
r. Judah in t. B. Metzi’a 3:25 and Sifra behar 4:2. This probably refers to r. Judah b. Ilai, a fourth gener-
ation tanna and one of r. Aqiva’s last five students. Renowned for his piety, his fairness, and his good
relations with gentiles, including Romans, Judah is the most frequently named sage in the Sifra and
Tosefta. See Strack and Stemberger, Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash, 84-85, and Margalioth, Ency-
clopedia of Talmudic and Geonic Sages, 1:397-403.
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Thus, in the first example, which clearly pertains to a deceptive query in a commer-
cial context, the deception is verbally enacted, and because the act is easily misconstrued
by the addressee and witnesses, the deception constitutes a crime of conscience. Rather
than a necessarily commercial context for the wrongful statements, it is these character-
istics — a verbal performance of the deceptive act, the difficulty of proving malicious
intent, and the potential but incalculable damage to the addressee — which are the rea-
sons why this example is grouped here with the next two examples. Unless verbal wrongs
against the penitent and the descendant of proselytes are also definitely rooted in com-
merce — a possibility, given the location of this mishnah in a literary context treating
commercial fraud — this disjunction is consistent with a stylistic difference between
the first example and the two subsequent examples: in the first example, the addressee
is an unspecified “him” (lô, implicitly referring to a vendor), whereas the next two cases
explicitly identify the addressees as a penitent and a descendant of proselytes, respec-
tively.37 This stylistic dissimilarity, in combination with the disambiguating variations
on the first example noted above (namely, lack of money and eyeing the item), points
to a redactional combination in this mishnah of material previously circulating in dif-
ferent form(s).
Support for the claim that only the first of these three examples should be under-
stood as necessarily rooted in a commercial setting, that the essential logical link among
the three is not commercial fraud, and that the three examples may have had other asso-
ciations (in the Babylonian context, at least) can be found in b. Pesahim 112b. In that
tractate the fraudulent price query appears as the second in a series of three mnemon-
ically grouped prohibitions conveyed to Rabbi by r. Ishmael b. r. Jose.38 The other two
warnings are not to litigate against three parties (lest two witnesses lie convincingly in
defence of a third liar) and to refrain from marital intercourse with one’s wife on the first
night after her post-menstrual ritual immersion (lest she not be completely past her
menstrual period). Intriguingly, for b. Pesahim 112b, the problematic link among these
three proscribed behaviours is the potential for damaging oneself rather than commer-
cial fraud or the risk of damaging someone else.39 This strengthens my impression that
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37 In the toseftan parallel, most smoothly in the Erfurt MS and in the editio princeps, an insulting state-
ment about the would-be proselyte has a public audience. Lieberman, Tosefta ki-feshutah, [Vol. 10]
Nezikin, 79.
38 The latter is a fifth generation tanna; r. Judah b. Ilai, to whom the teaching about false price queries is
attributed in several versions, is a fourth generation tanna.
39 As m. B. Metzi’a 4:4 makes clear, a charge of fraud may be brought against both the seller and the buyer.
This explains why an insincere price query exposes the buyer to the risk of self-injury.
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the logical connection among the three examples in m. B. Metzi’a 4:10 is the potential
damage caused by undetectably deceptive speech that cannot be proved to be malicious
(except by God), rather than the fact that all three exemplify both commercial and ver-
bal wronging.
It is, of course, reasonable to assume that a vendor’s commercial interests and dig-
nity would be harmed by speech that implicitly undermined his or her integrity. Perhaps
the second and third cases exemplify verbal wronging carried out by unscrupulous or
merely insensitive hagglers hoping for a better price. A buyer might seem to be impugn-
ing a seller’s character by referring to past transgressions, indirectly questioning the sin-
cerity of his or her repentance, or casting aspersions on the identity and integrity of a
vendor who was a descendant of proselytes. For example, the disparaging remarks might
imply that the goods were not properly tithed by an insincere penitent or by a Jew with
recent alien ancestry. The possibility that economic damage may ensue could explain the
grouping of the mishnah’s three cases, but it does not explain why these precise ex-
amples are classified as “verbal wronging,” nor does it explain the particular sequence
of the mishnah’s cases.
Strategic positioning of the three illustrations in the mishnah is indicated by the fact
that in none of the other, related versions does the price enquiry example come first. It
comes last in the Sifra and in the Bavli’s version of the baraita and appears in the penul-
timate position in the Tosefta. The sequence and content in the Sifra are virtually iden-
tical to the Bavli’s version of the baraita: the Bavli adds the example of oppressing the
prospective proselyte immediately following the example of recalling the misdeeds of
the descendant of proselytes. The toseftan parallel lacks the reference to the misdeeds
of the ancestors of a descendant of proselytes. Instead, immediately following the exam-
ple of a disingenuous price enquiry, it presents a subtle, exegetically rich polemic pro-
hibiting the oppression of proselytes.40 The toseftan sequence neatly presents two pairs
of examples; in each pairing, only the first example is explicitly set in a commercial
context. This sequence corresponds to that in the topical analogy statement introduc-
ing the baraita and the Mishnah.
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40 The citations include 1 Sam. 10:12, Prov. 30:4, and Prov. 19:14. For readings of this mishnah in the
context of painful insult, see Bamberger, Proselytism in the Talmudic Period, 158-59, and Porton, The
Stranger within Your Gates, 26 n. 235.
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The Exegetical Connection
The choice of a particular biblical excerpt in a given version of a tannaitic teaching with
several related or parallel versions often reflects the exegetical context or collection into
which it has been placed. Sifra roots its discussion in Lev. 25:14 and 25:17.41 Sifre on
Deuteronomy grounds its treatment of wronging the proselyte in Deut. 24:1742 whereas
the Mekilta de-r. Ishmael on Exodus not surprisingly cites Exod. 22:20, as does the
mishnah.43
The exegetical basis for the mishnah’s use of Exod. 22:20 may be the seeming redun-
dancy in the verse,44 which prohibits wronging the sojourner (lô tônê) and oppressing
the stranger (we7 lô tilh. ās.ennû). The use of these two verbs provides an exegetical open-
ing on the basis of the interpretative principle of the economy of scriptural language:
that is, the Torah need not have expressed the same point twice, and therefore two legal
issues are indicated. Thus, the verse forms an inclusio, paralleling the rhetorical pattern
in the opening, non-scriptural statement of this mishnah.
Another reason for the use of the verse in the mishnah may be verbal congruity
between the root of the word hônāyâ and the first of the two verbs in Exod. 22:20a:
“wrong” tônê. After all, the Mekilta de-r. Simeon bar Yohai reads each of the two verbs
in this verse to denote both types of wronging.45 In his careful discussion of parallels
between m. B. Metzi’a 4:10 and Sifra behar 3:4 and 4:1-2, Howard Apothaker notes that
the mishnah here draws a topical analogy between commercial and verbal fraud,
rather than justifying its prohibition of two kinds of wronging by appeal to an exe-
gesis of the apparent superfluity of Lev. 25:14 and 25:17.46 The mishnah’s initially
unjustified topical analogy here is not unusual: of nearly three dozen cases of topical an-
alogy in the Mishnah using this same formula (“just as . . . so too”), the majority do not
explicitly provide scriptural support. Apothaker reasonably suggests a connection between
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41 Sifra Dibbura deSinai BeHar 3:4,9; 4:1,2. In ch. 4:2 of BeHar, Job 4:6-7 is cited almost precisely as it used
in t. B. Metzi’a 3:25 in order to illustrate a problematic consoling comment. Apothaker, Sifra, Dibbura
deSinai, 91, 95, 99, and 100.
42 Finkelstein, Sifre on Deuteronomy, 297-98. Following usual rabbinic practice, Hammer reads gēr here
as proselyte; Hammer, Sifre: A Tannaitic Commentary, 272.
43 Lauterbach, Mekhilta De-Rabbi Ishmael, 2:451.
44 Apothaker, Sifra, Dibbura deSinai, 383-84.
45 Nelson, Mekhilta De-Rabbi Shimon Bar Yohai, ch. 75:1, p. 349.
46 The distinction between (scripturally) “unjustified” discourse typical of the Mishnah, and midrash
halakha, which is quintessentially (explicitly) scripturally “justificatory” discourse, is derived from
Halivni, Midrash, Mishnah, and Gemara, 1-8.
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the hermeneutical operation behind Sifra’s exegesis of the apparent superfluity in Lev.
25:14 and 25:17, on the one hand, and the mishnah’s possible grounding of its topical
analogy on the basis of an apparent superfluity in Exod. 22:20. A mishnah need not
explicitly quote a biblical text to allude to it. Moreover, as Apothaker points out, this
exegetical approach to apparent superfluities is a typical rabbinic move, and verbs using
the root ynh are found in both cases.47 In addition, he suggests that the three mishnaic
cases, like those in the parallel versions, are crimes of conscience that are punished by
God.48 Apothaker’s careful analysis does not, however, address the logic of the mish-
nah’s sequence. It is to this issue that I turn below, following some additional remarks
about the mishnah’s exegetical dimension.
It may well be that interpretations of near redundancy in Lev. 25:14 and 25:17,
which are well attested in several related texts (but not explicitly noted here), were
assumed by this mishnah’s transmitters or redactors. It is interesting, however, that nei-
ther the Mishnah nor the Mekilta parallels, which do employ the verse from Exodus,
contain the statement that “verbal wronging is worse” than commercial wronging.
This statement is found in the Tosefta and in the Bavli, both of which explicitly cite
the reference, in Lev. 25:17, to fearing God (not used in Lev. 25:14, which is therefore
“assigned” to commercial fraud) as proof that verbal fraud is worse. Neusner trans-
lates the tosefta’s use of we7 ‘ôd me7 rubbâ as “more abundant,” but the tosefta’s exegesis of
Lev. 25:17, the gemara in the Bavli, and the Bavli’s use of the formula gādôl [. . .] min (“a
greater [transgression] than”), indicate that severity rather than ubiquity is the tosefta’s
point.49
Alternatively, it is possible that the prohibition of two types of wronging in the mish-
nah did not require reference to Lev. 25:14 and 25:17. While Exod. 22:24-26 explicitly
prohibits economic oppression of the poor, Exod. 22:21-23 only implicitly prohibits
economic oppression of widows and orphans. One may surmise, therefore, that the
seemingly redundant prohibition of “wronging” and “oppressing” the stranger in Exod.
22:20 is being read in this mishnah as a warning against two categories of transgressive
behaviour: economic or commercial oppression, as in Exod. 22:24-26, and, at most,
implicitly economic oppression, as in Exod. 22:21-23.
“Verbal Wronging”: An Analysis of Speech Banned in m. Bava Metzi’a 4:10 185
47 Apothaker, Sifra, Dibbura deSinai, 100, 384.
48 Apothaker, Sifra, Dibbura deSinai, 100.
49 Neusner, The Tosefta, 2:1042. Cf. Lieberman, who cites corroborative traditions in m. ‘Arak. 3:5 and t.
‘Arak. 2:10, as well as the baraita paralleling t. B. Metzi’a 3:25 at b. B. Metzi’a 58b; Lieberman, Tosefta
Ki-Feshutah: Beur Arokh La-Tosefta, [Vol. 10] Nezikin, 79.
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An additional basis for the use of this verse may be that in both cases (in Exod.
22:21-26) the aggrieved parties, who are being maliciously oppressed, are without juridi-
cal recourse. Their only recourse is the judgement of the Deity. Likewise, for the three
victims of verbal oppression in the mishnah, there is no legally probative offence for
which the alleged victimizer can be prosecuted or sued in a court in Roman Palestine.
Just as in the case of the oppression of the gēr, verbal wronging is a crime of conscience.
The only means of redress for the victim is divine judgement, as in the case of the
oppressed Hebrews in Egypt and the wronged and oppressed widows, orphans, and
impoverished debtors in Exod. 22:21-26.
Perhaps the mishnah does not utilize Lev. 25:14 and 25:17 because they were not
seen to be needed as support for a prohibition of two kinds of wronging, and the mish-
nah does not explicitly indicate that verbal wronging is worse. As I argue below, what
the mishnah finds particularly problematic about the three examples of verbal wrong-
ing may be the probative complexity of demonstrating malice, whereas the talmudic
sugya into which this mishna has been embedded seems to emphasize the lasting (and
incalculable) consequences even of hurtful statements which are merely careless. The
three examples in the mishnah demonstrate that verbal wronging is easily concealed.
It seems crucial that the conclusion of the verse in Exod. 22:20 invokes the memory of
bondage in Egypt, for which God was the avenger (as in cases of concealed crimes of
conscience).
The verse from Exodus seems most directly applicable to the third case, that of the
proselyte (gēr), by virtue of the fact that the word gēr possessed a double signification
in the rabbinic lexicon. This double signification is preserved within the verse itself.
That is, although rabbinic interpreters generally read the term gēr as a signifier for “pros-
elyte,” the midrashic key to this verse is the rabbinic reading of gēr in two senses in this
verse: “proselyte” in 20a and “sojourner” in 20b.50 This double signification is also made
possible by Abraham’s reference to himself as a “resident stranger,” or gēr we7 tôšāb (Gen.
23:4), and by the familiar characterization of Abraham and Sarah as the first proselytes.
Equally important was biblical Israel’s narrative of its origins as (eventually) oppressed
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50 “Stranger” in the sense of “sojourner” should not be confused with “foreigner,” nokrî. As Lorberbaum
and Zohar explain, “A stranger who sojourns among Israelites is called ger in the Bible, sometimes
toshav, ‘resident,’ and sometimes ger toshav, ‘resident alien’.” In Rabbinic usage, gēr refers to a convert
to Judaism and gēr tôšāb to a resident gentile who has not converted; Lorberbaum and Zohar,“The Ter-
minology of Membership,” xxvi.
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sojourners in Egypt. Just as biblical legislation emphasized that the gēr (sojourner)
should not be confused with either the foreigner (nokrî) or the native-born Israelite
(’ezrāh·), this mishnah teaches that the descendant of gērîm (here, proselytes) should not
be oppressed by being reminded of his alien ancestry.51
Thus, there are several possible reasons for the transmitters of this mishnah to have
concluded it with the reference to Exod. 22:20: verbal congruity with the double signi-
fication of the word gēr as sojourner and proselyte; transitional notions of Jewishness
between ethnos and ethno-religion; allusion to Abraham’s and Israel’s associations with
sojourners and parties to the Covenant; associations of exegetical readings of apparent
superfluity in Lev. 25:14 and 25:17 with similarly apparent superfluity in the use of two
verbs signifying vexing in Exod. 22:20; and allusions to God’s role as avenger of the vic-
tims of crimes of conscience. The logical link among these three cases is the intentional
deception, as will be shown below.
The Forensic Challenges Posed by Suspected Verbal hônāyâ
It has long been noted that it is impossible for human beings to judge crimes of con-
science.52 As Baruch Schwartz explains, the phrase “you shall fear your God” occurs
“when compliance is a matter of conscience, rather than legal enforcement.”53 He observes
that matters of conscience are transgressions which only God can judge; the victims
“may never know how they have been used.”54 In addition to the importance of honour
and shame in rabbinic culture, verbal wronging was particularly problematic for the
tannaim on account of its forensic complexity.55 Only God can judge whether discourse
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51 In Mekilta de-r. Shimon bar yohai, both verbs are read to signify both commercial and verbal wrong-
ing. The Bavli attributes the observation that verbal wronging is worse to r. Yohanan in the name of
Simeon b. Yohai. The reference, in the Exodus verse, to Israel’s having been strangers in Egypt is inter-
preted to teach that “if you harass him for being a convert, I will harass you for being strangers in
Egypt.” The text at Masekhta de-neziqin 75:1 is taken from the critical edition and translation in Nel-
son, Mekhilta De-Rabbi Shimon Bar Yohai, 349. Rabbinic tradition generally reads the term gēr
(“sojourner” in Lev. 19:34) to signify “proselyte.” Philo likewise applies Lev. 19:33-34 and Deut. 10:18-
19 to proselytes, following the Septuagint’s translation of biblical gērîm as BD@FZ8LJ@4; Philo, De spe-
cialibus legibus, 1.9.52. Feldman, Jew and Gentile, 338.
52 Schwartz, “Leviticus,” 254.
53 Schwartz, “Leviticus,” 254. Cf. Lev. 19:14 and 32; Lev. 25:17, 36, and 43.
54 Schwartz does not explicitly connect these biblical crimes to the mishnah, nor does he refer explicitly
here to “verbal wronging,” although he may well have it in mind. Schwartz, “Leviticus,” 253-54.
55 For the term tannaim, see the Appendix.
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is intentionally hurtful and, therefore, whether such potentially damaging remarks con-
stitute verbal wronging.56
Although he does not analyse this text in his astute study of intention in talmudic
law, Michael Higger notes the particular importance of intention as a legal factor in
cases of humiliation: “In cases of civil wrongs, a wrongful act done to a person or to the
property of another, carries with it legal liability, irrespective of the intention with which
the act was done.”57 The legal principle is ādām mû‘ād le7‘ôlām, that is, “that a human is
responsible for all his acts” — including, to varying degrees of culpability, unintentional
acts.58 Higger demonstrates the sophistication of tannaitic analyses of intentionality, as
well as subsequent development of this legal concept. Higger compares the (later) tal-
mudic view of humiliation to blood-shedding or partial homicide,“where intent of the
act is sufficient to constitute a crime.”59 Given the legal significance of humiliation, as
well as the forensic importance of intention, it is clear that ascertaining intention in
cases of crimes of conscience such as verbal humiliation would have been both neces-
sary and unattainable. The Tosefta’s and the Sifra’s lengthier sets of different types of
examples underscore the virtual impossibility of determining (except by God) whether
verbal wrong has been committed. The related traditions in the Tosefta and Sifra pres-
ent two examples of verbal wronging not found in the mishnaic version. In both cases
it would be almost impossible to prove that the speaker’s offensive statement was delib-
erately deceptive or intentionally harmful. In the first example, one is warned against
knowingly misdirecting donkey-drivers, the longshoremen and truckers of the ancient
Mediterranean world, who are seeking wine and oil, to a merchant who has never sold
such items.60 The second example is a case of an ostensible expression of consolation
which, however, wounds the mourner.
In b. B. Bat. 91a there are two baraitas indicating that wine and oil are necessities
for survival, on which it is forbidden to make a profit, and that the prices of these items
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56 See Rashi on Isaiah 49:26, Lev. 25:14, b. B. Metzi’a 58b, and b. Qidd. 32b. His comments (inferentially
at Isaiah 49:26 and explicitly in the other contexts) suggest that dābār hammāsûr lālêb (“a hidden
thought,” in this case proving malicious intentions) is discerned and punished by God. For this reason
Lev. 25:17 uses the phrase “you shall fear your God.”
57 b. B. Qama 26a, 27a, 28b, 85b; b. Sanh 72b, 77a; Mek. Exod. 21:24 and 21:28; b. Git. 53a. Higger,“Inten-
tion in Talmudic Law,” 24-25.
58 Higger, “Intention in Talmudic Law,” 62.
59 Higger, “Intention in Talmudic Law,” 27.
60 See m. Demai 4:7. Regarding donkey-drivers’ solidarity and their collegia (guilds) as well as rabbinic com-
ments on them, including disparagements of their morals, regular rates etc; see Baron, A Social and Reli-
gious History of the Jews, 2:261 and 2:417 n. 37. Cf. Safrai, The Economy of Roman Palestine, 234-37.
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are dangerously low, endangering the survival of those who produce and sell them.
Another baraita at b. B. Bat. 90b-91a suggests a difference of opinion regarding the
legitimacy of selling these necessities for export, given the critical domestic need for
them; Rabbi permits such exports from Palestine to Syria.61 These baraitas suggest an
economic situation in which the provision of such goods to donkey-drivers, who would
have been the principal conveyers of such goods over inland trade routes and to ports
for overseas markets, would have been controversial. Some local merchants known to
sell these goods would conceivably refuse to make them available to donkey-drivers,
whose purchases might be for distant markets. Having been assured (falsely) by a local
resident that these basic foodstuffs can be obtained from a particular vendor who has,
in fact, never carried such items, the donkey-drivers will suspect that the merchant,
regardless of his assurances that he does not carry such goods, is simply refusing to sell
to them. Sifra behar 4:2 suggests that the person who excuses his deliberate misdirec-
tion of donkey-drivers as “fair counsel” — that is, an honest mistake — should know
that it is a matter of conscience, a clear allusion to crimes of conscience punishable
only by God.62
In the toseftan parallel to t. B. Metzi’a 3:25, a more disingenuous case immediately
follows the example of misdirecting donkey-drivers. This baraita cites the case of a gent-
ly phrased, but grossly insensitive remark to someone in mental anguish. The speaker
feigns giving comfort to someone who is plagued by misfortune, including one who
has buried his children. The remarks cite Job 4:6-7, using words implying that the
bereaved addressee (or, perhaps, his deceased children) were sinners. Just as in the dis-
ambiguating variants in the first example of verbal wronging in the mishnah, a clarify-
ing comment follows the tosefta’s example, suggesting that the insensitive words of
ostensible consolation might easily appear to have been uttered gently. This is undoubt-
edly the most vicious — and perhaps the least provable — example of verbal wronging
in all the textual parallels and variants.
Explaining the Sequence of Examples
All three remarks in the mishnah are misleading and potentially damaging, and on the
surface it is impossible to determine whether they are malicious. The subtlety of some
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61 As noted above,“Rabbi” refers to Judah I (d. c.217), the traditional editor of the Mishnah. This is a dif-
ferent figure than the ubiquitous r. Judah b. Ilai.
62 The rendering “fair counsel” is in Apothaker, Sifra, Dibbura deSinai, 100.
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of the cases is more discernible in the other, longer versions, but the elegant, incremen-
tal progression of the level of complexity, subtlety, and personal offence in the three
mishnaic examples is not found in the parallels, except possibly in the toseftan parallel,
which is closest to the mishnaic version in terms of the offensive trajectory. There the
examples of verbal wronging cut incrementally closer to the rabbinic cultural bone, as
it were, peaking at disparagement of a proselyte’s claim on Torah and Jewish identity,
which approximates the Mishnah’s trajectory. But the mishnah is subtler, inasmuch as
it addresses the case of the descendant of proselytes.
Baruch Schwartz observes a progression in the transgressions in Lev. 19:11-18 “from
the crimes most difficult to conceal to those which can never be proven and whose vic-
tims have no remedy whatsoever, leaving detection and punishment in the hands of
God alone.”63 The concept of “crimes of conscience” implicit in Lev. 19:11-18, together
with the rhetorical and logical pattern of increasing probative difficulty noted by
Schwartz, may have provided a model for the concept of “verbal wronging” and for the
pattern of three examples in m. B. Metzi’a 4:10.64 Just as in the examples of transgres-
sions in Lev. 19, the probative difficulty of the mishnah’s examples of verbal wrong-
ing — the impossibility of proving the speaker’s malicious intentions — increases as
the series of three examples progresses. In addition, the transgressions proscribed in
Lev. 19 progress from economic abuse that is relatively difficult to conceal (perhaps
related to the mishnah’s first example), to tale-bearing (perhaps related to the mish-
nah’s second example), to grudge-bearing (perhaps related to the mishnah’s third ex-
ample). Each transgression in Lev. 19 is increasingly more difficult to detect, and the
phrase “I the Lord am your God” points to the Deity’s role as judge and avenger.
The Mishna’s Second Example: The Penitent
The pattern of incremental progression found in the mishnah’s series of three examples
is not found in the parallels in Sifra and only partially in the Tosefta. This difference
may help to explain the mishnah’s selection and its sequence. In the first example, any
number of plausible excuses could be provided by a malicious or thoughtless person
posing a disingenuous price query. Similarly, in the second case, the speaker might
protest that his or her words cannot have harmed the genuine penitent, as the peni-
tent’s transgressive past is behind him or her. But the references to this past may cause
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64 Schwartz, “Leviticus,” 253-54.
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shame, embarrassment, economic loss, and a degradation in social status. The informa-
tion may not have been public, and witnesses may subsequently shun the addressee.
Revealing a penitent’s past may cause substantial, unforeseen, undetectable, and incal-
culable damage. Whether the utterance is malicious or careless cannot be discerned
with certainty by anyone but the Deity.
The Mishna’s Third Example: The Descendant of Proselytes
The third case seems even more far-fetched; that is, one might be inclined to think that
referring to the actions of the ancestors of the descendant of gērîm should not trouble
the proselyte, let alone the descendant of proselytes. But like the penitent whose past is
revealed, disclosure of or reference to the (implicitly problematic) behaviour of a per-
son’s proselyte parents prior to their entry into the Covenant undermines the status of
all proselytes present and future. Given abundant evidence in rabbinic literature, includ-
ing at the tannaitic layer, of anxiety and controversy regarding the authenticity and effi-
cacy of conversion, this is no idle concern.65
A careless speaker could come to the conclusion that such a statement is fair game
or harmless; if malicious, however, the statement is deeply troubling. The addressee is
biologically a child of gērîm, and his ancestors might well be associated with transgres-
sive behaviour. Nevertheless, the gēr, and all the more so the descendant of gērîm, is also
a descendant of Abraham, the first gēr, and thereby of Israel, once mistreated gērîm in
Egypt. The third example implies that the addressee’s status as a Jew is questionable.
Since the addressee is a descendant of gērîm, using the technical term ’ābôt (“fathers”
or “ancestors”) to refer to the addressee’s ancestors (and their presumably negative
actions) implicitly challenges both the addressee’s spiritual genealogy as a descendant
of Abraham and the authenticity of his proselyte ancestors’ conversion.66 Complicating
this case is that the statement may be a deliberate attack on the legitimacy of a Jew’s
status, or it may be a careless formulation in the context of an otherwise perfectly legit-
imate recollection of Egyptian oppression of Hebrews in prayers and in various bibli-
cal passages. The speaker’s motives are easily disguised in this case.
In addition, the comment in this third example might well lead to unforeseen
harm (if the remark is made innocently) or to calculated damage (if it is uttered
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65 Regarding fluidity in notions of Jewish identity in this period, see Cohen, The Beginnings of Jewishness,
and Boyarin, Border Lines.
66 Rabbinic literature reports debates regarding the question whether, like native-born Jews, proselytes could
refer to the patriarchs as their fathers in their prayers.
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maliciously) as the status of the addressee might be degraded in the eyes of witnesses.
The addressee (or witnesses) might conclude that his status, like that of his ancestors,
remains that of a proselyte, which, in the mishnaic hierarchy, is a social classification below
even that of the lowly nātîn (a caste of Temple servants) and only above the emancipated
slave.67 Another concern may be that, perhaps like the penitent in the second example,
the addressee in the third case might be tempted to revert. As Josephus remarks in
Against Apion 2.123, not all proselytes remain within the fold.68
Indications of ambivalence and controversy regarding the status of proselytes can
be seen in a variety of sources in the Hellenistic and early Roman periods, from Philo
and Josephus to rabbinic authorities.69 As Louis Feldman observes, although biblical
legislation (Deut. 17:15) barred the non-native born from the monarchy, Philo insists
that proselytes were to receive all the privileges of native-born Jews.70 At the very least,
Philo reads narrowly the repeated biblical statement that “there shall be one law for you
and the gēr” (e.g., Num. 15:15). Biblical legislation provides ample evidence of a more
complicated understanding of this issue.71 For the late Second Temple period, the Qum-
ran text 4 Q Florilegium (4QFl) on 2 Sam. 7 imagines the exclusion of gērîm from the
eschatological Temple. Some modern scholars understand gērîm here to refer to the bib-
lical category of resident aliens, while others read gērîm in 4QFl as a reference to pros-
elytes. Christine Hayes subscribes to the former view, reading “resident alien” in that
text but noting that although the Florilegium text implies that “the blemish of profane
seed can never be overcome,” the Temple Scroll does not.72
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67 See m. Hor 3:8.
68 Josephus, Against Apion, 2.123. Feldman cites various rabbinic traditions registering similar concerns;
Feldman, Jew and Gentile, 338.
69 See Bamberger, Proselytism in the Talmudic Period; Feldman, Jew and Gentile, 338-41; Porton, The
Stranger within Your Gates; Walzer et al., The Jewish Political Tradition 2:231-77; and Novak, “Gentiles
in Rabbinic Thought.”
70 Philo, De specialibus legibus, 1.9.52. Following the Septuagint, Philo reads biblical gērîm as proselytes
BD@FZ8LJ@4 and emphasizes the importance of respecting and welcoming them. See Feldman, Jew and
Gentile, 338. Regarding the biblical gēr, including the suggestion that Second Isaiah (e.g., Isaiah 56:7)
provides “the first glimmer of a new status for the gēr” (that is, as proselyte), see Milgrom, “The ‘Ger’,”
401.
71 See Milgrom, “The ‘Ger’.”
72 Hayes, Gentile Impurities, 62 and 240 n. 44. For a contrary reading of this point in 4QFl, see Baum-
garten, “Exclusions from the Temple,” 215-25. For the fourfold classification in t. Qidd. 5:1 (priests,
levites, Israelites, and proselytes), see Feldman, Jew and Gentile, 340 and 569 n. 188. The Mishnah states
that priests may not marry proselytes (m. Yebam. 6:5), wheras the Bavli states that, while children of
prohibited unions may not marry native-born Israelites, they may marry proselytes (b. Yebam. 79b).
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The (double) semantic range of the term gēr for the rabbis (“proselyte” and
“sojourner”) — corresponds to the tensions and seeming contradictions in rabbinic
attitudes regarding the proselyte’s status as (converted) Jew. Nevertheless, oppression of
the gēr — read doubly by the rabbis as sojourner and proselyte, even as they interpreted
the biblical term gēr as a signifier for proselyte — by a Jew would constitute a betrayal
of the originary narratives of Abraham’s conversion, the Exodus, and the Sinaitic
Covenant. This is underscored by the motive clause in the second half of Exod. 22:20,
which invokes Israel’s foundational past as gērîm in Egypt.
Conclusions
Alienating conflicts among rabbis seem to have generated a substantial body of mate-
rial in the Bavli. Jeffrey Rubenstein has demonstrated the extent to which public humil-
iation was a feature and a particular concern of the mature Babylonian talmudic acad-
emy.73 R. Aqiva’s elaborate but fruitless attempt to avoid hurting r. Eliezer’s feelings in
the Akhnai narrative (b. B. Metzi’a 59b) demonstrates the wisdom of Aqiva’s expres-
sion of doubt in Sifre devarim 1 as to whether anyone in his generation knows how to
rebuke someone (presumably without humiliating the addressee).74 Even when moti-
vated by seemingly noble intentions, and even when the speaker exercises great care,
words can wound. The mishna on verbal hônāyâ — disingenuous, damaging utterances
by speakers whose true intentions can be ascertained only by the Divine — provides an
exceptionally dramatic foundation for a talmudic sugya about destructive discourse in
the talmudic academy, perhaps precisely because it pushes one to weigh one’s words
and intentions with the utmost care.
The mishnah’s structure of doublets and triplets lends itself to memorization and
oral recitation. The opening statement and the closing prooftext are doublets, bracket-
ing a series of three cases. In each case the discussion of damaging speech becomes
incrementally more complex.
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Regarding judges, see m. Sanh. 4:2; regarding marriage restrictions, see, e.g., m. Yebam. 5:5, m. Qidd.
4:7. For a detailed analysis of rabbinic perspectives regarding proselytes as “newborn children” and of
the various rabbinic legal traditions differentiating native-born Jews from proselytes regarding, for
instance, eligibility to judge capital cases, marriage restrictions, and other differences see Porton, The
Stranger within Your Gates, 166-76 and 193-220.
73 Rubenstein, The Culture of the Babylonian Talmud.
74 My interpretation of Aqiva’s statement in the Sifre passage follows both Finkelstein and Hammer.
Finkelstein, Sifre on Deuteronomy, 3; Hammer, Sifre: A Tannaitic Commentary, 390.
11fl_23.1_daum.qxd  2008/11/19  16:02 PM  Page 193
This mishnaic pericope is grounded in a culture in which words are fundamentally
important. Verbal wronging may foster a misleading and profoundly false representa-
tion of the integrity, status, and identity of the person to whom the words are addressed,
in addition to causing significant economic damage. Only God can determine whether
malice motivated the remarks. This explains why parallel versions of this mishnah seem
to support more explicitly a reading of verbal hônāyâ as a crime of conscience. The
selection of these three cases, and the incremental difficulty of the mishnah’s examples,
may have been modelled after the crimes of conscience in Lev. 19:11-18. The biblical text
concluding the mishnah seems to apply only to the third case, given the common ref-
erences to the gēr, which can mean both “stranger” and “proselyte.” Invoking Exod. 22:20
in this mishnah, however, provides an exegetical basis for a somewhat disjunctive peri-
cope moving from commercial to verbal hônāyâ (corresponding to the two verbs in the
quoted passage). The Exodus passage also alludes to the doubly significant, culturally
loaded term gērîm, whose redeemer and covenantal partner is God. It points to God as
the judge of crimes of conscience such as verbal hônāyâ. Finally, it underscores the
moral outrage and the profound probative conundrum of malicious, deceptive oppres-
sion of the proximate “other,” explicitly including vendors, penitents, and descendants
of proselytes.
University of British Columbia
Appendix: A Brief Introduction to Terminology for Non-Specialists
The identification “m. B. Metzi’a 4:10” signifies the tenth paragraph of the fourth chap-
ter of the mishnaic tractate Bava Metzi’a (“Middle Gate”). B. Metzi’a is a tractate on
aspects of civil law in the Mishnah (c. early 3rd century CE). B. Metzi’a is the second trac-
tate in the fourth of the Mishnah’s six Orders; the fourth Order is called Ne4 zîqîn (“Dam-
ages” or “Torts”). The Mishnah is the pre-eminent, canonical collection of classical rab-
binic legal tradition putatively edited by the Roman-recognized leader of occupied
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Palestinian Jewry, Judah I. The pre-eminently authoritative Babylonian Talmud (also
Bavli), largely redacted in present-day Iraq perhaps by the early 7th century CE (but sub-
sequently further modified), is organized around the frame of the Mishnah’s six Orders.
A smaller Palestinian Talmud (also Yerushalmi) was edited until as late as the early 5th
century CE. A basic talmudic study unit, called a sûgyâ, consists of two principal parts:
a unit of mishnah and a unit of ge4mārā. Mishnah (in upper case) refers to the collec-
tion as a whole; mishnah (in lower case) signifies an individual pericope (a paragraph
unit) of the Mishnah. The rabbinic sages from c.70 CE until c.200 CE in Roman-occu-
pied Palestine, whose teachings are cited in the Mishnah, are called tannā’îm (“repeaters”;
sg. tannā’). When a tannaitic teaching appears outside the Mishnah in other antholo-
gies it is called a bāraîtā’ (“outside”). The earliest baraita collection (redacted c. 3rd cen-
tury CE) is called the Tosefta; tosefta (in lower case) refers to an individual unit. Although
the extant edition of the Tosefta probably was edited after the Mishnah, the Tosefta may
contain versions (or derivatives of versions) of tannaitic traditions predating the Mish-
nah’s versions of those traditions. Palestinian Jewish sages of roughly the 3rd to 6th cen-
tury and “Babylonian” Jewish sages in Sassanian Persia of roughly the 3rd to 6th cen-
tury are called ’āmôrā’îm (“speakers”; sg. ’āmôrā’). The sugya that opens with this
particular unit of mishnah runs from page 58b to 59b in b. Bava Metzi’a. Sifra is con-
cerned with Leviticus; Sifre, with Numbers and Deuteronomy. Qidd is the tractate Qid-
dushin, and m. Sanh, the mishnah tractate Sanhedrin.
The order Nezikin (or Neziqin) now consists of 10 tractates. At an earlier stage the
first three “Gates” tractates probably constituted one large tractate of 30 chapters. Two
important manuscripts, MS Kaufmann A 50 (Library of the Hungarian Academy of
Sciences, Budapest, 11th to 13th C.) and MS Parma (Biblioteca Palatina, De Rossi 138,
probably 11th C.), attest to this fact.75 Lieberman’s Tosefta edition is based principally
on the Vienna MS (National Library Vienna, Hebr. 20, Catalogue Schwarz No. 46). I
use standard abbreviations, e.g., r. = rabbi; m. = Mishnah; t. = Tosefta; B. Metzi’a = trac-
tate B. Metzi’a; b. = Bavli (Babylonian Talmud) or, in a personal name, “son of”; y. =
Yerushalmi. I employ SBL transliteration style for most Hebrew and Aramaic terms and
texts, but for terms such as tanna and baraita I use a popular style.
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75 On the dating of these manuscripts, see Strack and Stemberger, Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash,
158. See also Lapin, Early Rabbinic Civil Law. On Nezikin generally, see Strack and Stemberger, Intro-
duction to the Talmud and Midrash, 133-34.
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